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Abstract 
 
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Working Group One, a panel of 
experts established by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations 
Environment Programme, issued its updated, Fourth Assessment Report, forecasts. The Report 
was commissioned at great cost in order to provide policy recommendations to governments. It 
included predictions of dramatic and harmful increases in average world temperatures over the 
next 92 years. Using forecasting principles as our guide we asked, are these forecasts a good basis 
for developing public policy? Our answer is “no.” 
 To provide forecasts of climate change that are useful for policy-making, one would need 
to forecast (1) global temperature, (2) the effects of any temperature changes, (3) the effects of 
alternative policies, and (4) whether the best policy would be successfully implemented. Proper 
forecasts of all four are necessary for rational policy making.  
The IPCC Report was regarded as providing the most credible long-term forecasts of 
global average temperatures by 31 of the 51 scientists and others involved in forecasting climate 
change who responded to our survey. We found no references to the primary sources of 
information on forecasting methods despite the fact these are easily available in books, articles, 
and websites. In our audit of Chapter 8 of the IPCC’s WG1 Report, we found enough information 
to make judgments on 89 out of a total of 140 forecasting principles. The forecasting procedures 
that were described violated 72 principles. Many of the violations were, by themselves, critical. 
We concluded that the forecasts in the Report were not the outcome of scientific 
procedures. In effect, they were the opinions of scientists transformed by mathematics and 
obscured by complex writing. Research on forecasting has shown that experts’ predictions are not 
useful. Instead, policies should be based on forecasts from scientific forecasting methods. We 
have been unable to identify any scientific forecasts of global warming. Claims that the Earth will 
get warmer have no more credence than saying that it will get colder.  
 
Keywords: accuracy, audit, climate change, evaluation, expert judgment, mathematical models, 
public policy. 
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“A trend is a trend, 
But the question is, will it bend? 
Will it alter its course  
Through some unforeseen force 
And come to a premature end?” 
Alec Cairncross, 1969 
 
Research on forecasting has been conducted since the 1930s. Of particular value are comparative 
empirical studies to determine which methods are most accurate in given situations. The findings, 
along with the evidence, were first summarized in Armstrong (1978, 1985). The forecasting 
principles project, begun in the mid-1990s, summarized knowledge as evidence-based principles 
(condition-action statements) to provide guidance on which methods to use in a given situation. 
The project led to the Principles of Forecasting handbook (Armstrong 2001), which involved 40 
authors (all internationally known experts on forecasting methods) along with 123 reviewers (also 
leading experts on forecasting methods). The summarizing process alone required a four-year 
effort.  
Efforts have been made to ensure that these principles are easy to find. They have been freely 
available on forecastingprinciples.com, a site that has been first on Google searches for 
“forecasting” for many years. The directors’ objective for the site is to summarize all useful 
knowledge on forecasting methods. There is no other source that provides evidence-based 
forecasting principles. The site is often updated, and a recent update of evidence on some of the 
key principles was published in Armstrong (2006). 
Many of the principles go beyond common sense, and some are counter-intuitive. As a result, 
those who forecast in ignorance of the research literature are unlikely to produce useful 
predictions. For example, here are some of the well-established generalizations for situations 
involving long-term forecasts of complex issues where the causal factors are subject to 
uncertainty (as with climate): 
 
• Unaided judgmental forecasts by experts have no value. This applies whether the 
opinions are expressed in words, spreadsheets, or mathematical models. It also 
applies regardless of how much scientific evidence is possessed by the experts. 
Among the reasons for this are: 
a) Complexity:  People cannot assess complex relationships through 
unaided observations. 
b) Coincidence:  People confuse correlation with causation. 
c) Feedback:  People making judgmental predictions typically do not 
receive unambiguous feedback they can use to improve 
their forecasting.  
d) Bias:  People have difficulty in obtaining or using evidence that 
contradicts their initial beliefs. This problem is especially 
serious for people who view themselves as experts. 
• Agreement among experts is weakly related to accuracy. This is especially true 
when the experts communicate with one another and when they work together to 
solve problems, as is the case with the IPCC process.  
• Complex models (those involving nonlinearities and interactions) harm accuracy 
because their errors multiply. Ascher (1978), refers to the Club of Rome’s 1972 
forecasts where, unaware of the research on forecasting, the developers proudly 
proclaimed, “in our model about 100,000 relationships are stored in the computer. 
Complex models also tend to fit random variations in historical data well, with the 
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consequence that they forecast poorly and provide misleading conclusions about the 
uncertainty of the outcome. Finally, when complex models are developed there are 
many opportunities for errors and the complexity means the errors are difficult to 
find. Craig, Gadgil, and Koomey (2002) came to similar conclusions in their review 
of long-term energy forecasts for the US made between 1950 and 1980.  
• Given even modest uncertainty, prediction intervals are enormous. For example, 
prediction intervals (ranges outside which outcomes are unlikely to fall) expand 
rapidly as time horizons increase, so that one is faced with enormous intervals even 
when trying to forecast a straightforward thing such as automobile sales for General 
Motors over the next five years.  
• When there is uncertainty in forecasting, forecasts should be conservative.
Uncertainty arises when data contain measurement errors, when the series are 
unstable, when knowledge about the direction of relationships is uncertain, and 
when a forecast depends upon forecasts of related (causal) variables. For example, 
forecasts of no change were found to be more accurate than trend forecasts for 
annual sales when there was substantial uncertainty in the trend lines (e.g., Schnaars 
and Bavuso 1986). This principle also implies that forecasts should revert to long-
term trends when such trends have been firmly established, do not waver, and there 
are no firm reasons to suggest that they will change. Finally, trends should be 
damped toward no change as the forecast horizon increases.  
 
These conclusions were drawn from the forecasting principles in the edited handbook on 
forecasting (Armstrong 2001) and they are described at forecastingprinciples.com. A summary of 
the principles, now numbering 140, is provided in the Forecasting Audit on the site, where they 
are presented as a checklist.  
 
The Forecasting Problem 
 
In determining the best policies to deal with the climate of the future, a policy maker first has to 
select an appropriate statistic to use to represent the changing climate. By convention, the statistic 
is the averaged global temperature as measured with thermometers at ground stations throughout 
the world, though in practice this is a far from satisfactory metric (e.g., Essex et al., 2007).  
It is then necessary to obtain forecasts and prediction intervals for each of the following: 
 
1. What will happen to the mean global temperature in the long-term (say 20 years or 
longer)? 
2. If accurate forecasts of mean global temperature changes can be obtained and these 
changes are substantial, then it would be necessary to forecast the effects of the 
changes on the health of living things and on the health and wealth of humans. The 
concerns about changes in global mean temperature are based on the assumption that 
the earth is currently at the optimal temperature and that variations over years (unlike 
variations within years) are undesirable. For a proper assessment, costs and benefits 
must be comprehensive. (For example, policy responses to Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring should have been based in part on forecasts of the number of people who 
might die from malaria if DDT use were reduced). 
3. If reliable forecasts of the effects of the temperature changes on the health of living 
things and on the health and wealth of humans can be obtained and the forecasts are 
for substantial harmful effects, then it would be necessary to forecast the costs and 
benefits of alternative policy proposals.  
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4. If reliable forecasts of the costs and benefits of alternative policy proposals can be 
obtained and at least one proposal is predicted to lead to net benefits, then it would be 
necessary to forecast whether the policy changes can be implemented successfully.  
 
If reliable forecasts of policy implementation can be obtained and the forecasts clearly support net 
benefits for the policy, and the policy can be successfully implemented, then the policy proposal 
should be implemented. A failure to obtain scientifically validated forecasts at any stage would 
render subsequent stages irrelevant. Thus, we focus on the first of the four forecasting problems.  
Is it necessary to use scientific forecasting methods? In other words, to use methods that have 
been shown by empirical validation to be relevant to the types of problems involved with climate 
forecasting? Or is it sufficient to have leading scientists examine the evidence and make 
forecasts? We address this issue before moving on to our audits. 
 
On the value of forecasts by experts 
 
Many policy decisions are based on forecasts by experts. Research on persuasion has shown 
that people have substantial faith in the value of such forecasts. Faith increases when experts 
agree with one another. 
Our concern is with what we refer to as unaided expert judgments. In such cases, experts may 
have access to empirical studies and other information, but they use their knowledge to make 
predictions without the aid of well-established forecasting principles. Thus, they could simply use 
the information to come up with judgmental forecasts. Alternatively, they could translate their 
beliefs into mathematical statements (or models) and use those to make forecasts.   
Although they may seem convincing at the time, expert forecasts make for humorous reading 
in retrospect. Cerf and Navasky’s (1998) book contains 310 pages of examples, such as Fermi 
Award-winning scientist John von Neumann’s 1956 prediction that “A few decades hence, 
energy may be free”. Examples of expert climate forecasts that turned out to be completely wrong 
are easy to find, such as UC Davis ecologist Kenneth Watt’s prediction in a speech at 
Swarthmore College on Earth Day, April 22, 1970 that, “If present trends continue, the world will 
be about four degrees colder in 1990, but eleven degrees colder in the year 2000. This is about 
twice what it would take to put us into an ice age”  
Are these examples merely a matter of selective perception? The first author’s review of 
empirical research on this problem led to the “Seer-sucker theory,” stating that, “No matter how 
much evidence exists that seers do not exist, seers will find suckers” (Armstrong 1980). The 
amount of expertise does not matter beyond a basic minimum level. There are exceptions to the 
Seer-sucker Theory: When experts get substantial well-summarized feedback about the accuracy 
of their forecasts and about the reasons why their forecasts were or were not accurate, they can 
improve their forecasting. This situation applies for short-term (up to five day) weather forecasts, 
but we are not aware of any such regime for long-term global climate forecasting. Even if there 
were such a regime, the feedback would trickle in over many years before it became useful for 
improving forecasting. 
Research since 1980 has added support to the Seer-sucker Theory. In particular, Tetlock 
(2005) recruited 284 people whose professions included, “commenting or offering advice on 
political and economic trends.”  He asked them to forecast the probability that various situations 
would or would not occur, picking areas (geographic and substantive) within and outside their 
areas of expertise. By 2003, he had accumulated over 82,000 forecasts. The experts barely if at all 
outperformed non-experts and neither group did well against simple rules. 
Comparative empirical studies have routinely concluded that judgmental forecasting by 
experts is the least accurate of the methods available to make forecasts. For example, Ascher 
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(1978, p. 200), in his analysis of long-term forecasts of electricity consumption found that was the 
case. 
Experts’ forecasts of climate changes have long been popular. Anderson and Gainor (2006) 
found the following headlines in their search of the New York Times:
Sept. 18, 1924 “MacMillan Reports Signs of New Ice Age” 
March 27, 1933 “America in Longest Warm Spell Since 1776” 
May 21, 1974 “Scientists Ponder Why World’s Climate is Changing:  
A Major Cooling Widely Considered to be Inevitable” 
Dec. 27, 2005 “Past Hot Times Hold Few Reasons to Relax About New 
Warming” 
 
In each case, the forecasts were made with a high degree of confidence.  
In the mid-1970s, there was a political debate raging about whether the global climate was 
changing. The United States’ National Defense University (NDU) addressed this issue in their 
book, Climate Change to the Year 2000 (NDU 1978). This study involved nine man-years of 
effort by Department of Defense and other agencies, aided by experts who received honoraria, 
and a contract of nearly $400,000 (in 2007 dollars). The heart of the study was a survey of 
experts. It provided them with a chart of “annual mean temperature, 0-800 N. latitude,” that 
showed temperature rising from 1870 to early 1940 then dropping sharply up to 1970. The 
conclusion, based primarily on 19 replies weighted by the study directors, was that while a slight 
increase in temperature might occur, uncertainty was so high that “the next twenty years will be 
similar to that of the past” and the effects of any change would be negligible. Clearly, this was a 
forecast by scientists, not a scientific forecast. However, it proved to be quite influential. The 
report was discussed in The Global 2000 Report to the President (Carter) and at the World 
Climate Conference in Geneva in 1979.  
The methodology for climate forecasting used in the past few decades has shifted from 
surveys of experts’ opinions to the use of computer models. However, based on the explanations 
that we have seen, such models are, in effect, mathematical ways for the experts to express their 
opinions. To our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that presenting opinions in 
mathematical terms rather than in words will contribute to forecast accuracy. For example, 
Keepin and Wynne (1984) wrote in the summary of their study of the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis’s “widely acclaimed” projections for global energy that, “Despite the 
appearance of analytical rigour… [they] are highly unstable and based on informal guesswork”. 
Things have changed little since the days of Malthus in the 1800s, when he predicted that the 
demand for food would outpace supply, thus leading to mass starvation. He expressed his 
opinions mathematically: in his model, the supply of food increased arithmetically while 
population grew at a geometric rate. His mathematical model predicted inevitable starvation. 
International surveys of climate scientists from 27 countries, obtained by Brat and von Storch 
in 1996 and 2003, were summarized by Bast and Taylor (2007). Many scientists were skeptical 
about the predictive validity of climate models. Of more than 1,060 respondents, 35% agreed 
with the statement, “Climate models can accurately predict future climates,” and 47% percent 
disagreed. Members of the general public were also divided. An Ipsos Mori poll of 2031 people 
aged 16 and over found that 40% agreed that “climate change was too complex and uncertain for 
scientists to make useful forecasts”, while 38% disagreed (Eccleston 2007). 
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An examination of climate forecasting methods 
 
Our search for prior reviews of long-term climate forecasting processes yielded nine independent 
reviews. 
 
We also assessed the extent to which those who have made climate forecasts used evidence-based 
forecasting procedures. We did this by conducting Google searches. 
 
We then conducted a “forecasting audit.” The key aspects of such an audit are that:  
• all elements of the forecasting process are examined, 
• each principle against which the forecasting process is examined is supported by 
evidence or is self-evidently true and unchallenged by evidence, 
• the forecasting process is independently rated against each principle, preferably by 
more than one rater, and 
• the audit is fully disclosed. 
 
To our knowledge, no one has ever published a paper that is based on a forecasting audit, as 
defined here. We suspect, however, that such audits have been done for private firms. We suggest 
that for forecasts involving public policy, such audits should be expected and perhaps even 
required. In addition, they should be fully disclosed with respect to who did the audit, what biases 
might be involved, and what were the detailed findings from the audit. 
 
Reviews of climate forecasts 
 
We could not find any comprehensive reviews of climate forecasting efforts. With the exception 
of Stewart and Glantz (1985), the reviews did not refer to evidence-based findings. None of the 
reviews provided explicit ratings of the processes and, again with the exception of Stewart and 
Glantz, little attention was given to full disclosure of the reviewing process. Finally, some 
reviews ignored the forecasting methods and focused on the accuracy of the forecasts. 
Stewart and Glantz (1985) conducted an audit of the National Defense University (NDU 
1978) forecasting process that was described above. They were critical of the report because it 
lacked an awareness of proper forecasting methodology. Their audit was hampered because the 
organizers of the study said that the raw data had been destroyed and a request to the Institute for 
the Future about the sensitivity of the forecasts to the weights went unanswered. Judging from a 
Google Scholar search, climate forecasters have paid little attention to this paper.  
Carter, et al. (2006) examined the Stern Review (Stern 2007). They concluded that the authors 
of the Report made predictions without reference to scientific validation and without proper peer 
review.  
Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis (2007) concluded that the long-term climate forecasts they examined 
were based only on the opinions of the scientists. The scientists’ opinions were expressed in 
complex mathematical terms without any evidence on the validity of chosen approach. The 
authors provided the following quotation on their page 45 to summarize their assessment: 
“Today’s scientists have substituted mathematics for experiments, and they wander off through 
equation after equation and eventually build a structure which has no relation to reality (Nikola 
Telsa, inventor and electrical engineer, 1934).” While it is sensible to be explicit about beliefs and 
to formulate these in a model, forecasters must also demonstrate that the relationships are valid. 
Carter (2007) examined evidence on the predictive validity of the general circulation models 
(GCMs) used by the IPCC scientists.  He found that while the models included some basic 
principles of physics, scientists had to make “educated guesses” about the values of many 
parameters because knowledge about the physical processes of the earth’s climate is incomplete. 
In practice, the GCMs failed to predict recent global average temperatures as accurately as simple 
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curve-fitting approaches (Carter 2007, pp. 64 – 65). They also forecast greater warming at higher 
altitudes in the tropics when the opposite has been the case (p. 64). Further, individual GCMs 
produce widely different forecasts from the same initial conditions and minor changes in 
parameters can result in forecasts of global cooling (Essex and McKitrick, 2002). Interestingly, 
when models predict global cooling, the forecasts are often rejected as “outliers” or “obviously 
wrong” (e.g., Stainforth et al., 2005). 
Roger Pielke Sr. gave an assessment of climate models in a 2007 interview (available at 
http://climatesci.colorado.edu/2007/04/30/interview-by-marcel-crok-of-roger-a-pielke-sr-jan-
2007/):  
You can always reconstruct after the fact what happened if you run enough 
model simulations. The challenge is to run it on a independent dataset, say for the 
next five years. But then they will say “the model is not good for five years 
because there is too much noise in the system”. That’s avoiding the issue then. 
They say you have to wait 50 years, but then you can’t validate the model, so 
what good is it? 
…Weather is very difficult to predict; climate involves weather plus all these 
other components of the climate system, ice, oceans, vegetation, soil etc. Why 
should we think we can do better with climate prediction than with weather 
prediction? To me it’s obvious, we can’t!  
I often hear scientists say “weather is unpredictable, but climate you can 
predict because it is the average weather”. How can they prove such a statement?  
 
Bellamy and Barrett (2007) found serious deficiencies in the general circulation models 
described in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report. In particular, the models (1) produced very 
different distributions of clouds and none was close the actual distribution of clouds, (2) 
parameters for incoming radiation absorbed by the atmosphere and for that absorbed by the 
Earth’s surface varied considerably, (3) did not accurately represent what is known about the 
effects of CO2 and could not represent the possible positive and negative feedbacks about which 
there is great uncertainty. The authors concluded: 
The climate system is a highly complex system and, to date, no computer 
models are sufficiently accurate for their predictions of future climate to be relied 
upon. (p. 72)   
 
Trenberth (2007), a lead author of Chapter 3 in the IPCC WG1 report wrote in a Nature.com 
blog “… the science is not done because we do not have reliable or regional predictions of 
climate.” 
Taylor (2007) compared seasonal forecasts by New Zealand’s National Institute of Water and 
Atmospheric Research (NIWA) with outcomes for the period May 2002 to April 2007. He found 
NIWA’s forecasts of average regional temperatures for the season ahead were, at 48% correct. No 
more accurate than chance. That this is a general result was confirmed by New Zealand 
climatologist Dr Jim Renwick, who observed that NIWA’s low success rate was comparable to 
that of other forecasting groups worldwide. He added that “Climate prediction is hard, half of the 
variability in the climate system is not predictable, and so we don't expect to do terrifically well.” 
Dr Renwick is an author on Working Group I of the IPCC 4th Assessment Report, and also serves 
on the World Meteorological Organization Commission for Climatology Expert Team on 
Seasonal Forecasting. His expert view is that current GCM climate models are unable to predict 
future climate any better than chance (New Zealand Climate Science Coalition 2007). 
Similarly, Vizard, Anderson, and Buckley (2005) found seasonal rainfall forecasts for 
Australian townships were insufficiently accurate to be useful to intended consumers such as 
farmers planning for feed requirements. The forecasts were released only 15 days ahead of each 
three month period. 
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Climate forecasters’ use of the scientific literature on forecasting methods 
 
In April 2007, we used the Advanced Search function of Google Scholar to get a general sense of 
the extent to which environmental forecasters use scientific literature on forecasting methods. 
When we searched for “global warming” and “forecasting principles,” we found no relevant sites. 
Nor did we find any relevant sites for “forecastingprinciples.com” and “global warming.” Nor 
were there any relevant sites mentioned for the relevant-sounding paper, “Forecasting for 
Environmental Decision-Making” (Armstrong 1999) published in a book with a relevant title: 
Tools to Aid Environmental Decision Making.
We examined the references in Chapter 8 (on evaluation) of the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change’s Working Group One report. There were 788 references. Of these, none had 
any apparent relationship to forecasting methodology. The task was not that difficult as most 
papers had titles such as “Using stable water isotopes to evaluate basin-scale simulations of 
surface water budgets,” and “Oceanic isopycnal mixing by coordinate rotation.” 
 It is hard to understand how scientific forecasting could be conducted without any reference to 
the literature on how to make such forecasts. At a minimum, one would expect to see some 
empirical justification for the forecasting methods that were used. 
 
A survey to identify the most important long-term forecasts of global temperature 
 
We conducted a survey of scientists involved in long-term climate forecasting and policy makers. 
Our primary concern was to identify the most important forecasts and how those forecasts were 
made. In particular, we wished to know if the most widely accepted forecasts of global average 
temperature were based on the opinions of experts or on scientific forecasting methods. Given the 
conclusion from our Google search that many scientists are unaware of evidence-based findings 
related to forecasting methods, our hypothesis was that the forecasts were based on the opinions 
of scientists. 
We sent a questionnaire to experts who had expressed diverse opinions on global warming. 
We generated lists of experts by identifying key people and asking them to identify others. (The 
lists are provided in Appendix A.) Most (70%) of the 240 experts on our lists were IPCC 
reviewers and authors. 
The questionnaire asked the experts to provide references for what they regarded as the most 
credible source of long-term forecasts of mean global temperatures.  
 We strove for simplicity to minimize resistance to our request. Even busy people should have 
time to send a few references, especially if they believe that it is important to evaluate the quality 
of the forecasts that will influence major decisions.     
 We received useful responses from 51 people, 42 of whom provided references to what they 
regarded as credible sources of long-term forecasts of mean global temperatures. Interestingly, 
eight respondents provided references in support of their claims that no credible forecasts exist. 
Of the 42 expert respondents who were associated with global warming views, 30 referred us to 
the IPCC’s report.  
Based on the replies to this survey, it was clear that the IPCC’s Working Group 1 Report 
contained the forecasts that are viewed as most credible by the bulk climate community. These 
forecasts are contained in Chapter 10 of the  Report and the models that are used to forecast 
climate are assessed in Chapter 8, “Climate Models and Their Evaluation” (Randall et al. 2007). 
Chapter 8 provided the most useful information on the forecasting process used by the IPCC to 
derive forecasts of mean global temperatures, so we audited that chapter. 
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A forecasting audit for global warming 
 
Interestingly, some IPCC climate forecasters claim that the IPCC does not provide forecasts but 
rather presents scenarios or “projections.” However, the word “forecast” and its derivatives 
occurred 37 times, and “predict” and its derivatives occurred 90 times in the body of Chapter 8. 
Recall also that most of our respondents (29 of whom were IPCC authors or reviewers) 
nominated the IPCC report as the most credible source of forecasts (not “projections”) of global 
average temperature.  
Chapter 8 was, in our judgment, poorly written. The writing showed little concern for the 
target readership, provided extensive detail on items that are of little interest in judging the merits 
of the forecasting process, provided references without describing what readers might find, and 
imposed an incredible burden on readers by providing 788 references. The readability of the 
chapter was low. For example, Section 8.2.1.3 “Parameterization,” a critical section for 
understanding the forecasting process, scored 23 for Flesch-Kinkaid Reading Ease (“plain 
English” is 60 and the Harvard Law Review scores 32), and a “grade level” Gunning-Fog Index 
of 21. In addition, the Chapter reads in places like a sales brochure; in the three-page executive 
summary, the terms, “new” and “improved” and related derivatives appeared 17 times. Most 
significantly, the chapter omitted key details on the assumptions and the forecasting process that 
were used. 
We each made a formal, independent audit of IPCC Chapter 8 in May 2007. To do so, we 
used the Forecasting Audit software on the forecastingprinciples.com site, which is based on 
material originally published in Armstrong (2001). To our knowledge, it is the only evidence-
based tool for evaluating forecasting procedures.  
While Chapter 8 required many hours to read, it took us each about one hour to rate the 
forecasting approach described in the Chapter using the Audit software. We have each been 
involved with developing the Forecasting Audit program, so other users would likely require 
much more time. Ratings are on a 5-point scale from -2 to +2. A rating of +2 indicates the 
forecasting procedures were consistent with a principle, and a rating of -2 indicates failure to 
comply with a principle. The Audit software also has options to indicate that there is insufficient 
information to rate the procedures or that the principle is not relevant to a particular forecasting 
problem. 
 Our initial overall average ratings were similar at -1.37 and -1.35. We compared our 
individual ratings for individual principles and discussed inconsistencies. In some cases we 
averaged the ratings, truncating toward zero, in other cases we decided that there was insufficient 
information or that the information was too ambiguous to rate with confidence. Our final ratings 
are fully disclosed in the Special Interest Group section of the forecastingprinciples.com site that 
is devoted to Public Policy (publicpolicyforecasting.com).  
Of the 140 principles in the Forecasting Audit, we judged that 127 were relevant for auditing 
the forecasting problem addressed in Chapter 8. The Chapter provided insufficient information to 
rate the forecasting procedures that were used against 38 of these principles. For example, we did 
not rate the Chapter against Principle 10.2, “Use all important variables.” At least in part, our 
difficulty in auditing the Chapter was due to the fact that it was abstruse. It was sometimes 
difficult to know whether the information we sought was present or not.  
Of the 89 forecasting principles that we were able to rate, the Chapter violated 72. Adherence 
to some of the key principles is necessary for forecasts to be valid. We address three such 
principles, all based on strong empirical evidence: violation of any one of them would render the 
IPCC climate forecasts invalid. All three of these key principles were violated by the forecasting 
procedures described in IPCC Chapter 8. We key these principles to their numbering in the 
Forecasting Audit software. 
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Principle 1.4: Consider whether a formal forecasting procedure can beat a naïve method 
This principle refers to whether a forecasting method can be developed that would do better than 
a naïve method such as predicting that the weather next May will be the same as the weather last 
May.  
Interestingly, naïve methods are often strong competitors. This is especially so when there is 
much uncertainty. To the extent that uncertainty is high, forecasters should emphasize the naïve 
method. (This is illustrated by regression model coefficients: when uncertainty increases, the 
coefficients tend towards zero.) Departures from the naïve model tend to increase forecast error 
when uncertainty is high. 
In our judgment, the uncertainty in forecasting global mean temperature is extremely high. 
For example, there is controversy among climate scientists over the current trend. One researcher, 
Carter (2007, p. 67) wrote: 
…the slope and magnitude of temperature trends inferred from 
time-series data depend upon the choice of data end points. 
Drawing trend lines through highly variable, cyclic temperature 
data or proxy data is therefore a dubious exercise. Accurate direct 
measurements of tropospheric global average temperature have 
only been available since 1979, and they show no evidence for 
greenhouse warming. Surface thermometer data, though flawed, 
also show temperature stasis since 1998.  
Global climate is complex. Scientific evidence on many key relationships is weak or absent; 
e.g., does increased CO2 in the atmosphere cause high temperatures or do high temperatures 
increase CO2 (e.g. Jaworowski 2007)? Measurements of key variables such as local temperatures 
and a representative global temperature are contentious in the case of modern measurements, 
because of the distribution of weather stations and possible artifacts such as the urban heat island 
effect, and often speculative in the case of ancient ones, such as those climate proxies derived 
from tree ring and ice-core data (Carter 2007). Finally, it is difficult to forecast the causal 
variables.  
The already high level of uncertainty rises rapidly as the forecast horizon increases. 
While the authors of Chapter 8 claim that the forecasts of global mean temperature are well-
founded, their language is imprecise and relies heavily on such words as “generally,” “reasonable 
well,” “widely,” and “relatively” [to what?]. The report makes many explicit references to 
uncertainty. For example, the phrases “. . . it is not yet possible to determine which estimates of 
the climate change cloud feedbacks are the most reliable” and “Despite advances since the TAR, 
substantial uncertainty remains in the magnitude of cryospheric feedbacks within AOGCMs” 
appear on p. 593. In discussing the modeling of temperature, the authors wrote, “The extent to 
which these systematic model errors affect a model’s response to external perturbations is 
unknown, but may be significant” (p. 608), and, “The diurnal temperature range… is generally 
too small in the models, in many regions by as much as 50%” (p. 609), and “It is not yet known 
why models generally underestimate the diurnal temperature range.” The following words and 
phrases appear at least once in the Chapter: unknown, uncertain, unclear, not clear, disagreement, 
uncertain, not fully understood, appears, not well observed, variability, variety, difference, 
unresolved, not resolved, and poorly understood. 
Given the high uncertainty, the appropriate naïve method for this situation would be the “no-
change” model.  Remarkably, nowhere does the IPCC Report address the issue of forecastability. 
It should have been addressed prior to spending enormous sums on complex forecasting models.  
In effect, given the current state of uncertainty regarding climate, prior evidence on 
forecasting methods suggests that attempts to improve upon the naïve model might increase 
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forecast error. To reverse this conclusion, one would have to produce validated evidence in favor 
of alternative methods. Such evidence is not provided in Chapter 8 of the IPCC report. 
We are not suggesting that climate change cannot be forecast, only that this has yet to be 
demonstrated. We expect that such methods as the naïve model with drift, rule-based forecasting, 
well-specified simple causal models, and combined forecasts might prove useful. All of those 
methods are discussed in Armstrong (2001). To our knowledge, none of them has been examined 
to date. 
 
Principle 9.3: Do not use fit to develop the model.  
 
It was not clear to us to what extent the models produced by the IPCC are either based on, or have 
been tested against, sound empirical data. However, some statements were made about the ability 
of the models described in Chapter 8 to fit historical data, after tweaking their parameters. 
Extensive research has shown that the ability of models to fit historical data has little relationship 
to forecast accuracy (See “Evaluating Methods” in Armstrong 2001.) It is well known that fit can 
be improved by making a model more complex. The consequence of increasing complexity to 
improve fit, however, is to decrease the accuracy of forecasts. The 12 authors of Chapter 8 
appeared to be unaware of this principle. 
 
Principle 13.26: Use out-of-sample data to test the forecasts.
Chapter 8 did not provide evidence on the accuracy of ex ante long-term forecasts from the 
models used to generate the IPCC’s forecasts of climate change. It would have been feasible to 
assess the accuracy of alternative forecasting methods for short- and medium-term forecasts by 
using “successive updating.” This involves withholding data on a number of years, then providing 
forecasts for one-year ahead, then two-years ahead, and so on up to, say, 20 years. The actual 
years could be disguised during these validation procedures. Furthermore, the years could be 
reversed (without telling the forecasters) to assess back-casting accuracy. If, as is suggested by 
forecasting principles, the models were unable to improve on the accuracy of forecasts from the 
naïve method in such tests, there would be no reason to suppose that accuracy would improve for 
longer forecasts.   
 
Summary of audit findings 
 
A list of the 72 violations of forecasting principles by the IPCC forecasting procedures is 
provided on the Public Policy Special Interest Group Page at forecastingprinciples.com. The 
many violations provide further evidence that the IPCC authors were unaware of evidence-based 
principles for forecasting. If they were aware of them, it would have been incumbent on them to 
present evidence to justify their departures from best forecasting practice. They did not do so.  
We conclude that because the forecasting processes examined in Chapter 8 overlook scientific 
evidence on forecasting, the IPCC forecasts of climate change are not scientific. 
We invite others to provide evidence-based audits of Chapter 8. As with peer review, we will 
require all relevant information on the people who conduct the audits prior to posting the audits. 
The Forecasting Audit should be used early and often by climate change forecasters and their 
clients, as it should be by those involved in other public policy issues such as national health plan 
proposals and proposals for gun control. Doing so would help to ensure that they are using 
appropriate forecasting procedures. Outside evaluators should also be encouraged to conduct 
audits. The audit reports should be made available to both the sponsors of the study and the public 
by posting on an open web site such as publicpolicyforecasting.com. 
 
12
Conclusions 
 
To provide forecasts of climate change that are useful for policy-making, one would need to 
prepare forecasts of (1) global temperature, (2) the effects of any temperature change, (3) the 
effects of proposed policy changes, and (4) whether the best policies would be successfully 
implemented. A failure to properly forecast for any of these four problems would nullify any 
value for policy making.  
 The Stern Review concluded that, “The scientific evidence is now overwhelming; climate 
change presents very serious global risks, and it demands an urgent global response” (Stern 2007, 
p. xv). We have not been able to find any scientific evidence to support such a claim.  
 We have shown that failure occurs at the first stage of analysis. Specifically, we have been 
unable to find a scientific forecast to support the currently widespread belief in “global warming.” 
Prior research on forecasting suggests that a naïve (no change) forecast would be superior to 
current predictions which are, in effect, experts’ judgments.   
Based on our Google searches, those forecasting long-term climate change have no apparent 
knowledge of evidence-based forecasting methods, so we expect that the same conclusions would 
apply to the other three necessary parts of the forecasting problem. 
By relying on evidence-based forecasting methods, we conclude that policies founded on 
predictions of man-made global warming from models based on the opinions of scientists will be 
harmful.  
Given the conditions involved in long-term global forecasts and the high uncertainty 
involved, prior research on forecasting suggests that even if the forecasting methods were 
properly applied, it may not be possible to improve upon the naïve, “no-change,” forecast. We do 
not even have evidence that it is possible to make useful medium term (e.g., one to five year) 
forecasts. 
 Our paper is concerned with rational assessments of public policy, not with public opinions. 
People will continue to believe that serious manmade global warming exists as they will continue 
to believe other things that have no scientific support (e.g., the biblical creation story, astrology, 
minimum wages to help poor people, and so on), and public opinion can be intense on such 
issues. Public policy makers should, however, be concerned with how to move away from 
emotions and towards rational scientific analysis. 
One might say that it is important to consider steps to prevent global warming, but we have 
the same level of confidence in saying that we should take steps to prevent global cooling. The 
more important question is “what is the best way to invest our resources for the benefit of 
mankind?” This would lead to such trade-offs as asking whether it is better to spend a dollar on 
reducing AIDS or air pollution or malaria or breast cancer, where we know what policies will 
work, or to spend it on controlling future climate, where uncertainty about the situation is high. 
Given the large uncertainties of climate change science, government polices on climate control 
are unwarranted and will reduce the well-being of the great majority of people who are not the 
beneficiaries of the wealth redistribution that will occur as a result of such policies. Advocates 
owe it to the people who would be affected by the policies they recommend to base their 
advocacy on scientific forecasts that address all four of the key areas that are necessary for a 
rational analysis of the problem. We hope that before committing resources, decision makers will 
insist on scientific forecasts rather than accept the opinions of some scientists. 
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Appendix A: People to whom we sent our questionnaire (* indicates a relevant response) 
IPCC Working Group 1 
Myles Allen, Richard Alley, Ian Allison, Peter Ambenje, Vincenzo Artale, Paulo Artaxo, 
Alphonsus Baede, Roger Barry, Terje Berntsen, Richard A. Betts, Nathaniel L. Bindoff, Roxana 
Bojariu, Sandrine Bony, Kansri Boonpragob, Pascale Braconnot, Guy Brasseur, Keith Briffa, 
Aristita Busuioc, Jorge Carrasco, Anny Cazenave, Anthony Chen*, Amnat Chidthaisong, Jens 
Hesselbjerg Christensen, Philippe Ciais*, William Collins, Robert Colman*, Peter Cox, Ulrich 
Cubasch, Pedro Leite Da Silva Dias, Kenneth L. Denman, Robert Dickinson, Yihui Ding, Jean-
Claude Duplessy, David Easterling, David W. Fahey, Thierry Fichefet*, Gregory Flato, Piers M. 
de F. Forster*, Pierre Friedlingstein, Congbin Fu, Yoshiyuki Fuji, John Fyfe, Xuejie Gao, 
Amadou Thierno Gaye*, Nathan Gillett*, Filippo Giorgi, Jonathan Gregory*, David Griggs, 
Sergey Gulev, Kimio Hanawa, Didier Hauglustaine, James Haywood, Gabriele Hegerl*, Martin 
Heimann*, Christoph Heinze, Isaac Held*, Bruce Hewitson, Elisabeth Holland, Brian Hoskins, 
Daniel Jacob, Bubu Pateh Jallow, Eystein Jansen*, Philip Jones, Richard Jones, Fortunat Joos, 
Jean Jouzel, Tom Karl, David Karoly*, Georg Kaser, Vladimir Kattsov, Akio Kitoh, Albert Klein 
Tank, Reto Knutti, Toshio Koike, Rupa Kumar Kolli, Won-Tae Kwon, Laurent Labeyrie, René 
Laprise, Corrine Le Quéré, Hervé Le Treut, Judith Lean, Peter Lemke, Sydney Levitus, Ulrike 
Lohmann, David C. Lowe, Yong Luo, Victor Magaña Rueda, Elisa Manzini, Jose Antonio 
Marengo, Maria Martelo, Valérie Masson-Delmotte, Taroh Matsuno, Cecilie Mauritzen, Bryant 
Mcavaney, Linda Mearns, Gerald Meehl, Claudio Guillermo Menendez, John Mitchell, Abdalah 
Mokssit, Mario Molina, Philip Mote*, James Murphy, Gunnar Myhre, Teruyuki Nakajima, John 
Nganga, Neville Nicholls, Akira Noda, Yukihiro Nojiri, Laban Ogallo, Daniel Olago, Bette Otto-
Bliesner, Jonathan Overpeck*, Govind Ballabh Pant, David Parker, Wm. Richard Peltier, Joyce 
Penner*, Thomas Peterson*, Andrew Pitman, Serge Planton, Michael Prather*, Ronald Prinn, 
Graciela Raga, Fatemeh Rahimzadeh, Stefan Rahmstorf, Jouni Räisänen, Srikanthan (S.) 
Ramachandran, Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Venkatachalam Ramaswamy, Rengaswamy Ramesh, 
David Randall*, Sarah Raper, Dominique Raynaud, Jiawen Ren, James A. Renwick, David Rind, 
Annette Rinke, Matilde M. Rusticucci, Abdoulaye Sarr, Michael Schulz*, Jagadish Shukla, C. K. 
Shum, Robert H. Socolow*, Brian Soden, Olga Solomina*, Richard Somerville*, Jayaraman 
Srinivasan, Thomas Stocker, Peter A. Stott*, Ron Stouffer, Akimasa Sumi, Lynne D. Talley, Karl 
E. Taylor*, Kevin Trenberth*, Alakkat S. Unnikrishnan, Rob Van Dorland, Ricardo Villalba, Ian 
G. Watterson*, Andrew Weaver*, Penny Whetton, Jurgen Willebrand, Steven C. Wofsy, Richard 
A. Wood, David Wratt, Panmao Zhai, Tingjun Zhang, De'er Zhang, Xiaoye Zhang, Zong-Ci 
Zhao, Francis Zwiers* 
 
Union of Concerned Scientists 
Brenda Ekwurzel, Peter Frumhoff, Amy Lynd Luers 
 
Channel 4 “The Great Global Warming Swindle” documentary (2007) 
Bert Bolin, Piers Corbyn*, Eigil Friis-Christensen, James Shitwaki, Frederick Singer, Carl 
Wunsch* 
 
Wikipedia’s list of global warming “skeptics” 
Khabibullo Ismailovich Abdusamatov*, Syun-Ichi Akasofu*, Sallie Baliunas, Tim Ball, Robert 
Balling*, Fred Barnes, Joe Barton, Joe Bastardi, David Bellamy, Tom  Bethell, Robert Bidinotto, 
Roy Blunt, Sonja Boehmer, Andrew Bolt, John Brignell*, Nigel Calder, Ian Castles*, George 
Chilingarian, John Christy*, Ian Clark, Philip Cooney, Robert Davis, David Deming*, David 
Douglass, Lester Hogan, Craig Idso, Keith Idso, Sherwood Idso, Zbigniew Jaworowski, Wibjorn 
Karlen, William Kininmonth, Nigel Lawson, Douglas Leahey, David Legates, Richard Lindzen*, 
Ross Mckitrick*, Patrick Michaels, Lubos Motl*, Kary  Mullis, Tad Murty, Tim Patterson, Benny 
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Peiser*, Ian Plimer, Arthur Robinson, Frederick Seitz, Nir Shaviv, Fred Smith, Willie Soon, 
Thomas Sowell, Roy Spencer, Philip Stott, Hendrik Tennekes, Jan Veizer, Peter Walsh, Edward 
Wegman 
 
Other sources 
Daniel Abbasi, Augie Auer, Jonathan Boston, Daniel Botkin*, Reid Bryson, Robert Carter*, 
Ralph Chapman, Al Gore, Kirtland C. Griffin*, David Henderson, Christopher Landsea*, Bjorn 
Lomborg, Tim Osborn, Roger Pielke*, Henrik Saxe, Thomas Schelling*, Matthew Sobel, 
Nicholas Stern*, Brian Valentine*, Antonio Zichichi. 
